


The Sudan Campaigns 1881-1898

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- 1 Private, Black Watch, Egypt 1882
- 2 Private, Royal Marine Light Infantry, Egypt 1882
- 3 Corporal of Horse, Life Guards, Egypt 1882


1 Trooper, 21st Lancers, Sudan 1898

2 Trooper, 21st Lancers, Sudan 1898



1 Hademdownah Warrior, 1884-98

2 Taaishi Warrior, 1884-98





The Tokar Expedition. Disembarkation of Parker Pasha's troops with stores at Trinkitat for the relief of Tokar. The expedition was short-lived and ended in the disastrous first battle of El Teb (4 February 1884). Drawing by Melton Prior, war artist for the *Illustrated London News*. (National Army Museum/*Illustrated London News*)

two armies were resting peacefully, the one side dreaming probably little of the terrible scene of the awakening, when their rest at length rudely disturbed, they awoke to see swiftly advancing upon every side an endless line of dreaded red-coats, broken by the even *more fearful* blue of the Marines.' The Egyptians were totally defeated at a cost of 399 casualties among the British force, 43 of which were from the front-line troops of the Highland Brigade.

After a forced march the following day the troops entered Cairo and captured Arabi, who surrendered his sword to General Drury Lowe. Arabi was tried in December 1882 and banished to Ceylon, but was pardoned in 1901.

The Sudan 1881-1883

While the Egyptian army had been preoccupied with fighting the British expeditionary force, the Mahdi in the Sudan did very much as he pleased. Britain had been unwillingly drawn into Egypt, which she now garrisoned, but Gladstone's firm

opposition to imperialism for whatever reasons drew the line at intervention in the Sudan. The undisputed fact was, however, that Egypt's security rested on keeping the Sudan subdued, and Britain had assumed the responsibility of Egypt. The newly-formed Anglo-Egyptian army under British officers, financed by the Khedive and not the British tax payer, would have to solve the problem. Soldiers under British officers should be able to deal with the ill-armed savages of the Sudan, who, it was thought, possessed mainly spears and a few small-arms.

The Mahdi's troops had already defeated an Egyptian force under Yussif Pasha, who succeeded Raouf Pasha in March 1882. The Mahdi had also decided to establish his base at El Obeid and by September his troops were ready for the assault. The attack launched on 8 September failed, and the Mahdi was hastily forced to find an excuse for his followers, to whom he had previously declared



The battle of Tamai, by G. D. Giles. During this battle the British 'broke' the British square. Note the fierce hand-to-hand fighting on the left, the medical orderlies attending to the wounded in the centre and the reserve ammunition mules to the right. (National Army Museum)

that the enemy bullets could not kill them. Lacking adequate firepower, he settled down to starve out the city, which fell on 19 January 1883, yielding up large supplies of arms and munitions. An Egyptian relief force of 3,000 which set out in September was systematically slaughtered.

In February, Cairo learned of the disaster of El Obeid and the ensuing slaughter, and decided that some firmer action must be taken. A retired Indian army officer re-employed as Chief of Staff in the new Egyptian army was chosen to lead an expedition. William Hicks, or 'Hicks Pasha' as he was called, had not had a particularly distinguished career. He had spent most of his career in India, having fought in the Mutiny and taken part in the Abyssinian campaign of 1867. Aided by a few other British officers but hampered by the interference of an eighty-year-old Pasha to whom he was subordinate, he endeavoured to instil some fighting spirit into his 9000 men. It was a

hopeless task. Most of the army defeated by Walker and their morale was a shambles. Hicks' fighting qualities. This in his troops was not echoed by his officers. 'We were all killed,' said Colonel the Hon. J. Colborne, 'in going forward to the campaign of the question as the Mahdi at Khartoum. 'Whether Hicks stated the *Pall Mall Gazette* that not a single British soldier was killed at Khartoum if the Mahdi's force under the orders of Hicks.

Later Colborne noted in *With Hicks Pasha in the Sudan* the quality of the troops: 'During the Cairo, men and officers had no idea of their drill. When the guns were brought into action, they ran against each other; they were not with cartridges; hoppers were used but where they should have appeared to have the slightest idea of feed, aim, and discharge of the gun. Of all this, poor Walker - no